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# Appendix A: List of Filings Containing Parties' Final Proposed Incentive Plans, Plan Data Runs, and Plan Comments

#### **Final Proposed Plans**

Pacific Bell Telephone Company's (U 1001 C) Submission of Performance Remedies Plan. Filed March 23, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

Revised Interim Verizon Performance Plan for the State of California. Filed May 4, 2001, Verizon California, Inc.

Updated Interim Incentive Model. Filed May 4, 2001, Office of Ratepayers Advocates, California Public Utilities Commission.

Participating Competitive Local Exchange Carriers' Second Revised Interim Performance Incentives Plan. Filed May 11, 2001, Participating Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs).<sup>1</sup>

#### **Data Runs**

Pacific Bell Telephone Company's Submission of Comparisons of Proposed Performance Incentives Models. Filed April 27, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

Pacific Bell Telephone Company's Second Submission of Comparisons of Proposed Performance Incentives Models. Filed May 7, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

Attachment to: Pacific Bell Telephone Company's (U 1001 C) Opening Comments on Performance Remedies Plan (May 18, 2001). Filed May 18, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Participating CLECs include AT&T Communications of California, Inc. (U-5002-C, ICG Telecom Group, Inc.. (U-5406-C), New Edge Networks, Inc. (U-6226-C), Pac-West Telecomm, Inc. (U-5266-C), WorldCom, Inc., and XO California, Inc. (U-6272-C).

Submission of Verizon California Inc. of Data Results for Proposed Interim Incentive Plans, and Correction of Verizon's Proposed Interim Incentive Proposal. Filed May 4, 2001, Verizon California, Inc.

Second Data Results Submission of Verizon California Inc. Filed May 11, 2001, Verizon California, Inc.

Verizon's letter to the Docket Office re: Second Data Results Submission of Verizon California Inc. (5 copies of CD-ROM discs) Filed May 16, 2001, Verizon California, Inc.

#### **Comments**

Pacific Bell Telephone Company's (U 1001 C) Opening Comments on Performance Remedies Plan (May 18, 2001). Filed May 18, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

Opening Comments of Verizon California Inc. (U 1002) Concerning Exchanged Data Runs Applicable to Proposed Interim Incentive Plans. Filed May 18, 2001, Verizon California, Inc.

Comments of the Participating Local Exchange Carriers Regarding Performance Remedies Plans. Filed May 18, 2001, CLECs.

Opening Comments of the Office of Ratepayers Advocates to the Proposed Interim Preformance Incentives Plan. Filed May 18, 2001, Office of Ratepayers Advocates, California Public Utilities Commission.

Pacific Bell Telephone Company's (U 1001 C) Opening Comments on the CLECs' and Verizon's Proposed Performance Remedies Plan (May 25, 2001). Filed May 25, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

Opening Comments of Verizon California Inc. (U 1002 C) Regarding May 11, 2001 Data Runs Performed By Pacific Bell. Filed May 25, 2001, Verizon California Inc.

Supplemental Comments of the Office of Ratepayer Advocates to Pacific Bell's May 18 Data Analysis of the Proposed Interim Performance Incentives Plans Submitted By Verizon, Inc. and the Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, Filed May 25, 2001, Office of Ratepayer Advocates, California Public Utilities

Commission.

Pacific Bell Telephone Company's (U 1001 C) Reply to the Comments Filed May 18, 2001 on the Proposed Performance Remedies Plan (June 1, 2001). Filed June 1, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

Reply Comments of Verizon California Inc. (U 1002C) Concerning Exchanged Data Runs Applicable to Interim Incentive Plans. Filed June 1, 2001, Verizon California, Inc.

Responses of the Participating Competitive Local Exchange Carriers Regarding the May 18, 2001 Filings of Pacific Bell and Verizon California, Inc. Filed June 1, 2001, CLECs.

Concurrent Reply Comments of the Office of Ratepayer Advocates to the Opening Comments on Proposed Interim Performance Incentive Plans. Filed June 1, 2001, Office of Ratepayer Advocates, California Public Utilities Commission.

Errata to the Concurrent Reply Comments of the Office of Ratepayer Advocates to the Opening Comments on Proposed Interim Performance Incentive Plans. Filed June 1, 2001, Office of Ratepayer Advocates, California Public Utilities Commission.

Comments of the Participating Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) Regarding the Pacific Bell Data Outcomes For the Plans Submitted By Verizon California, Inc. and the CLECs, and the Verizon Data Outcome For the CLECs Plan, Filed on May 18, 2001. Filed June 4, 2001, CLECs.

Opening Comments of the Office of Ratepayer Advocates to Verizon's Revised Data Analyses of the Proposed Interim Performance Incentive Plans. Filed June 4, 2001, Office of Ratepayer Advocates, California Public Utilities Commission.

Pacific Bell Telephone Company's (U 1001 C) Reply to the Clecs' Comments Filed June 4, 2001 on the Proposed Performance Remedies Plan (June 8, 2001). Filed June 8, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

Reply Comments of Verizon California Inc. (U 1002 C) to the Further Opening Comments of the Clecs and Ora. Filed June 8, 2001, Verizon California, Inc.

Comments of the Participating Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs)

Regarding the Opening Comments of Pacific Bell on the CLECs' and Verizons' Plans Filed May 25, 2001. Filed June 8, 2001, CLECs.

Concurrent Reply Comments of the Office of Ratepayer Advocates to the Opening Comments on Exchanged Data Runs Applicable to Proposed Interim Performance Incentive Plans. Filed June 8, 2001, Office of Ratepayer Advocates, California Public Utilities Commission.

#### **Appendix B: Payment Amounts Generated by the Proposed Plans.**

#### Sources:

Payment amounts: Attachment to *Pacific Bell Telephone Company's (U 1001 C) Opening Comments on Performance Remedies Plan (May 18, 2001)*. Filed May 18, 2001, Pacific Bell Telephone Company.

Graphed aggregate failure rates: Calculated by staff using program and data files provided by Pacific Bell.

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Results from the Pacific Plan on Real Data without Logs

		Mitigation and Conditional Failure						No Mitigation and Conditional Failure					
Year	Month	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total
2000	Jan	\$52,400	\$12,000	\$64,400	\$52,400	\$0	\$52,400	\$164,300	\$28,000	\$192,300	\$164,300	\$0	\$164,300
2000	Feb	\$37,150	\$7,500	\$44,650	\$37,150	\$0	\$37,150	\$108,550	\$9,500	\$118,050	\$108,550	\$0	\$108,550
2000	Mar	\$28,450	\$5,000	\$33,450	\$28,450	\$0	\$28,450	\$82,300	\$7,500	\$89,800	\$82,300	\$0	\$82,300
2000	Apr	\$28,050	\$4,500	\$32,550	\$28,050	\$0	\$28,050	\$104,600	\$6,500	\$111,100	\$104,600	\$0	\$104,600
2000	May	\$28,900	\$4,000	\$32,900	\$28,900	\$0	\$28,900	\$96,200	\$6,500	\$102,700	\$96,200	\$0	\$96,200
2000	Jun	\$25,750	\$6,500	\$32,250	\$25,750	\$0	\$25,750	\$101,200	\$9,000	\$110,200	\$101,200	\$0	\$101,200
2000	Jul	\$33,300	\$7,000	\$40,300	\$33,300	\$0	\$33,300	\$113,650	\$9,000	\$122,650	\$113,650	\$0	\$113,650
2000	Aug	\$38,150	\$10,000	\$48,150	\$38,150	\$0	\$38,150	\$136,200	\$12,000	\$148,200	\$136,200	\$0	\$136,200
2000	Sep	\$34,050	\$8,500	\$42,550	\$34,050	\$0	\$34,050	\$128,800	\$10,500	\$139,300	\$128,800	\$0	\$128,800
2000	Oct	\$39,150	\$11,000	\$50,150	\$39,150	\$0	\$39,150	\$110,850	\$13,000	\$123,850	\$110,850	\$0	\$110,850
2000	Nov	\$30,900	\$11,000	\$41,900	\$30,900	\$0	\$30,900	\$115,650	\$13,000	\$128,650	\$115,650	\$0	\$115,650
2000	Dec	\$29,150	\$5,500	\$34,650	\$29,150	\$0	\$29,150	\$96,450	\$7,500	\$103,950	\$96,450	\$0	\$96,450
	Total	\$405,400	\$92,500	\$497,900	\$405,400	\$0	\$405,400	\$1,358,750	\$132,000	\$1,490,750	\$1,358,750	\$0	\$1,358,750
	Avg	\$33,783	\$7,708	\$41,492	\$33,783	\$0	\$33,783	\$113,229	\$11,000	\$124,229	\$113,229	\$0	\$113,229

Results from the Pacific Plan on Real Data with Logs

		Mitigation a	nd Conditional	Failure	Mitigation and No Conditional Failure			No Mitigation a	and Conditio	onal Failure	No Mitigation and No Conditional Failure			
Year	Month	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	
2000	Oct	\$41,750	\$11,500	\$53,250	\$41,750	\$0	\$41,750	\$128,200	\$13,500	\$141,700	\$128,200	\$0	\$128,200	
2000	Nov	\$40,900	\$12,000	\$52,900	\$40,900	\$0	\$40,900	\$149,150	\$14,000	\$163,150	\$149,150	\$0	\$149,150	
2000	Dec	\$38,550	\$8,000	\$46,550	\$38,550	\$0	\$38,550	\$123,400	\$10,000	\$133,400	\$123,400	\$0	\$123,400	
	Total	\$427,400	\$96,500	\$523,900	\$427,400	\$0	\$427,400	\$1,436,550	\$136,000	\$1,572,550	\$1,436,550	\$0	\$1,436,550	

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#### Results from the CLEC Plan on Real Data without Logs

											No Mitigation	on and No Co	nditional
		Mitigation a	nd Condition	al Failure	Mitigation an	d No Condition	onal Failure	No Mitigation	and Condition	onal Failure		Failure	
Year	Month	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total
2000	Jan	\$4,677,944	\$4,126,673	\$8,804,617	\$4,640,444	\$4,087,503	\$8,727,947	\$4,771,919	\$4,126,673	\$8,898,592	\$4,679,337	\$4,087,503	\$8,766,839
2000	Feb	\$3,420,514	\$3,750,714	\$7,171,229	\$3,383,225	\$3,711,466	\$7,094,692	\$3,546,613	\$3,750,714	\$7,297,327	\$3,450,447	\$3,711,466	\$7,161,913
2000	Mar	\$3,402,581	\$3,600,408	\$7,002,989	\$3,355,144	\$3,449,780	\$6,804,925	\$3,499,307	\$3,600,408	\$7,099,715	\$3,417,984	\$3,449,780	\$6,867,765
2000	Apr	\$3,990,822	\$3,809,043	\$7,799,866	\$3,911,896	\$3,754,165	\$7,666,061	\$4,109,129	\$3,809,043	\$7,918,172	\$3,969,809	\$3,754,165	\$7,723,974
2000	May	\$4,108,831	\$3,033,594	\$7,142,426	\$4,077,224	\$3,020,808	\$7,098,033	\$4,201,633	\$3,033,594	\$7,235,228	\$4,129,394	\$3,020,808	\$7,150,203
2000	Jun	\$4,553,750	\$3,953,712	\$8,507,462	\$4,464,562	\$3,927,309	\$8,391,871	\$4,683,618	\$3,953,712	\$8,637,330	\$4,547,229	\$3,927,309	\$8,474,538
2000	Jul	\$3,395,739	\$3,132,964	\$6,528,703	\$3,341,272	\$3,080,467	\$6,421,739	\$3,516,469	\$3,132,964	\$6,649,434	\$3,405,554	\$3,080,467	\$6,486,021
2000	Aug	\$4,584,810	\$4,480,216	\$9,065,026	\$4,494,537	\$4,277,437	\$8,771,974	\$4,781,330	\$4,480,216	\$9,261,546	\$4,598,029	\$4,277,437	\$8,875,467
2000	Sep	\$4,570,444	\$4,179,979	\$8,750,423	\$4,524,723	\$4,152,586	\$8,677,308	\$4,706,468	\$4,179,979	\$8,886,447	\$4,588,281	\$4,152,586	\$8,740,867
2000	Oct	\$4,083,838	\$4,786,303	\$8,870,141	\$4,000,724	\$4,661,303	\$8,662,028	\$4,201,199	\$4,786,303	\$8,987,502	\$4,060,651	\$4,661,303	\$8,721,954
2000	Nov	\$3,810,718	\$4,339,456	\$8,150,174	\$3,651,799	\$4,298,232	\$7,950,031	\$3,939,890	\$4,339,456	\$8,279,345	\$3,744,905	\$4,298,232	\$8,043,136
2000	Dec	\$4,045,131	\$3,532,986	\$7,578,117	\$3,974,544	\$3,520,399	\$7,494,944	\$4,136,295	\$3,532,986	\$7,669,281	\$4,023,263	\$3,520,399	\$7,543,662
	Total	\$48,645,123	\$46,726,049	\$95,371,173	\$47,820,095	\$45,941,456	\$93,761,551	\$50,093,869	\$46,726,049	\$96,819,919	\$48,614,883	\$45,941,456	\$94,556,339

#### Results from the CLEC Plan on Real Data with Logs

											No Mitigation	on and No Co	nditional
		Mitigation a	Mitigation and Conditional Failure			d No Condition	onal Failure	No Mitigation	n and Conditi	onal Failure		Failure	
Year	Month	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total
2000	Oct	\$4,475,533	\$5,300,023	\$9,775,556	\$4,372,795	\$5,170,322	\$9,543,116	\$4,618,196	\$5,300,023	\$9,918,220	\$4,440,998	\$5,170,322	\$9,611,320
2000	Nov	\$4,757,330	\$4,924,324	\$9,681,653	\$4,654,107	\$4,884,769	\$9,538,877	\$4,898,140	\$4,924,324	\$9,822,463	\$4,723,539	\$4,884,769	\$9,608,309
2000	Dec	\$4,695,756	\$4,078,302	\$8,774,058	\$4,543,414	\$3,887,470	\$8,430,884	\$4,821,681	\$4,078,302	\$8,899,983	\$4,616,838	\$3,887,470	\$8,504,308
	Total	\$50,634,054	\$48,369,953	\$99,004,007	\$49,763,343	\$47,404,084	\$97,167,427	\$52,154,504	\$48,369,953	##########	\$50,567,441	\$47,404,084	\$97,971,525

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Results from the ORA Plan on Real Data without Logs

Vaar	Manth	Mitigation and	Mitigation and No	No Mitigation and	No Mitigation and No Conditional
Year	Month	Conditional Failure	Conditional Failure	Conditional Failure	Failure
2000	Jan	\$480,359	\$480,359	\$480,359	\$480,359
2000	Feb	\$6,195,173	\$6,195,173	\$6,195,173	\$6,195,173
2000	Mar	\$14,651,867	\$14,651,867	\$14,651,867	\$14,651,867
2000	Apr	\$8,286,242	\$8,286,242	\$8,286,242	\$8,286,242
2000	May	\$1,447,820	\$1,447,820	\$1,447,820	\$1,447,820
2000	Jun	\$783,058	\$783,058	\$783,058	\$783,058
2000	Jul	\$1,274,248	\$1,274,248	\$1,274,248	\$1,274,248
2000	Aug	\$689,755	\$689,755	\$689,755	\$689,755
2000	Sep	\$13,232,020	\$13,232,020	\$13,232,020	\$13,232,020
2000	Oct	\$2,472,857	\$2,472,857	\$2,472,857	\$2,472,857
2000	Nov	\$1,957,299	\$1,957,299	\$1,957,299	\$1,957,299
2000	Dec	\$1,003,870	\$1,003,870	\$1,003,870	\$1,003,870
	Total	\$52,474,567	\$52,474,567	\$52,474,567	\$52,474,567

#### Results from the ORA Plan on Real Data with Logs

Year	Month	Mitigation and Conditional Failure	Mitigation and No Conditional Failure	No Mitigation and Conditional Failure	No Mitigation and No Conditional Failure
2000	Oct	\$2,687,169	\$2,687,169	\$2,687,169	\$2,687,169
2000	Nov	\$2,345,315	\$2,345,315	\$2,345,315	\$2,345,315
2000	Dec	\$2,238,154	\$2,238,154	\$2,238,154	\$2,238,154
	Total	\$54,311,179	\$54,311,179	\$54,311,179	\$54,311,179

5/17/2001

Results from the Verizon Plan on Real Data without Logs

		Mitigation an	d Conditio	nal Failure	Mitigation and No Conditional Failure			No Mitigation and Conditional Failu						
Year	Month	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	
2000	Jan	\$239,916	\$1,978	\$241,894	\$239,916	\$0	\$239,916	\$249,327	\$1,978	\$251,305	\$249,327	\$0	\$249,327	
2000	Feb	\$6,576,514	\$1,160	\$6,577,674	\$6,576,514	\$0	\$6,576,514	\$8,927,055	\$1,160	\$8,928,215	\$8,927,055	\$0	\$8,927,055	
2000	Mar	\$2,499,795	\$721	\$2,500,516	\$2,499,795	\$0	\$2,499,795	\$2,691,077	\$721	\$2,691,798	\$2,691,077	\$0	\$2,691,077	
2000	Apr	\$1,548,027	\$675	\$1,548,702	\$1,548,027	\$0	\$1,548,027	\$5,413,374	\$675	\$5,414,049	\$5,413,374	\$0	\$5,413,374	
2000	May	\$297,482	\$575	\$298,057	\$297,482	\$0	\$297,482	\$562,944	\$575	\$563,519	\$562,944	\$0	\$562,944	
2000	Jun	\$699,323	\$953	\$700,276	\$699,323	\$0	\$699,323	\$703,571	\$953	\$704,524	\$703,571	\$0	\$703,571	
2000	Jul	\$414,511	\$1,145	\$415,656	\$414,511	\$0	\$414,511	\$397,468	\$1,145	\$398,614	\$397,468	\$0	\$397,468	
2000	Aug	\$3,546,966	\$1,596	\$3,548,562	\$3,546,966	\$0	\$3,546,966	\$3,507,712	\$1,596	\$3,509,308	\$3,507,712	\$0	\$3,507,712	
2000	Sep	\$1,107,414	\$1,347	\$1,108,761	\$1,107,414	\$0	\$1,107,414	\$1,021,098	\$1,347	\$1,022,445	\$1,021,098	\$0	\$1,021,098	
2000	Oct	\$4,918,657	\$1,695	\$4,920,352	\$4,918,657	\$0	\$4,918,657	\$4,661,707	\$1,695	\$4,663,402	\$4,661,707	\$0	\$4,661,707	
2000	Nov	\$911,677	\$1,719	\$913,396	\$911,677	\$0	\$911,677	\$701,546	\$1,719	\$703,265	\$701,546	\$0	\$701,546	
2000	Dec	\$753,999	\$851	\$754,850	\$753,999	\$0	\$753,999	\$533,647	\$851	\$534,498	\$533,647	\$0	\$533,647	
	Total	\$23,514,281	\$14,414	\$23,528,695	\$23,514,281	\$0	\$23,514,281	\$29,370,526	\$14,414	\$29,384,940	\$29,370,526	\$0	\$29,370,526	

Results from the Verizon Plan on Real Data with Logs

		Mitigation an	d Conditio	nal Failure	Mitigation and No Conditional Failure			No Mitigation a	nd Conditi	onal Failure	No Mitigation and No Conditional Failure				
Year	Month	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total		
2000	Oct	\$4,968,175	\$1,772	\$4,969,947	\$4,968,175	\$0	\$4,968,175	\$4,727,610	\$1,772	\$4,729,382	\$4,727,610	\$0	\$4,727,610		
2000	Nov	\$970,826	\$1,875	\$972,701	\$970,826	\$0	\$970,826	\$694,587	\$1,875	\$696,462	\$694,587	\$0	\$694,587		
2000	Dec	\$835,328	\$1,237	\$836,565	\$835,328	\$0	\$835,328	\$595,984	\$1,237	\$597,221	\$595,984	\$0	\$595,984		
	Total	\$23,704,276	\$15.034	\$23,719,311	\$23,704,276	\$0	\$23,704,276	\$29.491.807	\$15.034	\$29.506.841	\$29,491,807	\$0	\$29.491.807		

5/17/2001

#### **Results from Simulated Data**

	ī												
		Mitigation	and Condition	onal Failure	Mitigation and	d No Conditio	nal Failure	No Mitigation	and Conditi	onal Failure		ion and No Co Failure	onditional
	Scenario	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total
Pacific	A	\$10,486	\$28				\$10,486	_	\$1,167		_	\$0	\$67,656
	В	\$145,775	\$47,333				\$145,775		\$74,000	\$483,867		\$0	\$409,867
	С	\$772,194	\$420,667	\$1,192,861	. ,	\$0	\$772,194		\$462,222			\$0	\$2,119,675
	D	\$5,905,283	\$1,510,222			\$0	\$5,905,283					\$0	\$8,850,008
	•												
											No Mitigati	ion and No Co	onditional
		•	and Condition		Mitigation and			No Mitigation				Failure	
	Scenario	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total
CLEC	Α	\$2,672,580	\$574,900			\$528,879	\$3,093,410		\$574,900			\$528,879	\$3,251,394
	В	\$7,282,435	\$7,116,099	\$14,398,534			\$13,981,742			\$14,668,888			\$14,151,049
	С	\$12,289,368	\$13,733,851	\$26,023,218	\$11,748,467	\$13,258,808	\$25,007,275	\$12,585,647	\$13,733,851	\$26,319,498	\$11,939,778	\$13,258,808	\$25,198,586
	D	\$22,509,064	\$26,361,808	\$48,870,872	\$21,393,516	\$25,674,070	\$47,067,586	\$22,834,535	\$26,361,808	\$49,196,343	\$21,615,928	\$25,674,070	\$47,289,998
	1												
		Mitigation	Mitigation	No Mitigation	No Mitigation								
		and	and No	and	and No								
		Conditional		Conditional	Conditional								
	Scenario	Failure	Failure	Failure	Failure								
ORA	Α	\$65,329	\$65,329		\$65,329								
	В	\$401,540	\$401,540	\$401,540	\$401,540								
	С	\$639,355	\$639,355	\$639,355	\$639,355								
	D	\$1,250,400	\$1,250,400	\$1,250,400	\$1,250,400								
	i												
								ı		J	No Mitigati	ion and No Co	onditional

		Mitigation and Conditional Failure			Mitigation and No Conditional Failure			No Mitigation and Conditional Failure			Failure		
	Scenario	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total	Tier I	Tier II	Total
Verizon	Α	\$81,835	\$0	\$81,835	\$81,835	\$0	\$81,835	\$200,591	\$0	\$200,591	\$200,591	\$0	\$200,591
	В	\$3,343,006	\$3,603	\$3,346,609	\$3,343,006	\$0	\$3,343,006	\$2,355,210	\$3,603	\$2,358,813	\$2,355,210	\$0	\$2,355,210
	С	\$6,281,303	\$7,656	\$6,288,959	\$6,281,303	\$0	\$6,281,303	\$4,507,864	\$7,656	\$4,515,520	\$4,507,864	\$0	\$4,507,864
	D	\$12,929,103	\$14,697	\$12,943,800	\$12,929,103	\$0	\$12,929,103	\$8,535,089	\$14,697	\$8,549,786	\$8,535,089	\$0	\$8,535,089

#### 4/26/2001

#### **Failure Rates by Scenario**

Scenario	Miss	Chronic	Extended
Α	7%	0.30%	0.02%
В	14%	5%	3%
С	23%	11%	8%
D	38%	21%	14%


#### Note:

Miss Average percentage of observations missed using a 10% alpha for parity measures and the Interim Decision rules for benchmarks

**Chronic** The percentage of observations missed for three (or more) consecutive months

**Extended** The percentage of observations missed for six (or more) consecutive months

# Pacific Plan Monthly Payments Projected on Pacific's Year 2000 Performance Calculated Without Log Transformations




Note: The charts on this and following pages have different vertical scales for payment amounts. The payment amounts differ greatly between plans, and to illustrate each plan's month-to-month variability it was necessary to graph the results on separate charts. The percentage-failure scales on the right side of each graph are the same for all graphs.


# Verizon Plan Monthly Payments Projected on Pacific's Year 2000 Performance Calculated Without Log Transformations



CLEC Plan Monthly Payments Projected on Pacific's Year 2000 Performance Calculated Without Log Transformations



#### ORA Plan Monthly Payments Projected on Pacific's Year 2000 Performance Calculated Without Log Transformations



#### **Appendix C: ARMIS 43-01 Cost and Revenue Table**

43-01: Table I. Cost and Revenue Table

Amounts are in thousands of dollars

Year	Company Name	Row_#	Row_Title	State	Interstate	Total
1999	Pacific Bell - California	1090	Total Operating Revenues	6756623	2224451	
1999	Pacific Bell - California	1190	Total Operating Expenses	4966092	1420923	
1999	Pacific Bell - California	1290	Other Operating Income/Losses	7129	1990	
1999	Pacific Bell - California	1390	Total Non-operating Items (Exp)	462168	-4596	
1999	Pacific Bell - California	1490	Total Other Taxes	241580	106806	
1999	Pacific Bell - California	1590	Federal Income Taxes (Exp)	239303	205737	
1999	Pacific Bell - California	1915	Net Return	854609	497572	1352181
1999	GTE/California	1090	Total Operating Revenues	2136807	619986	
1999	GTE/California	1190	Total Operating Expenses	1316914	337785	
1999	GTE/California	1290	Other Operating Income/Losses	297	82	
1999	GTE/California	1390	Total Non-operating Items (Exp)	62015	427	
1999	GTE/California	1490	Total Other Taxes	94807	32679	
1999	GTE/California	1590	Federal Income Taxes (Exp)	198151	78216	
1999	GTE/California	1915	Net Return	465217	170961	636178
2000	Pacific Bell - California	1090	Total Operating Revenues	6819557	2424598	
2000	Pacific Bell - California	1190	Total Operating Expenses	4832501	1533942	
2000	Pacific Bell - California	1290	Other Operating Income/Losses	848	285	
2000	Pacific Bell - California	1390	Total Non-operating Items (Exp)	444109	-10272	
2000	Pacific Bell - California	1490	Total Other Taxes	265990	111167	
2000	Pacific Bell - California	1590	Federal Income Taxes (Exp)	308431	231478	
2000	Pacific Bell - California	1915	Net Return	969374	558568	1527942
2000	GTE/California	1090	Total Operating Revenues	2036288	688796	
2000	GTE/California	1190	Total Operating Expenses	1335789	336626	
2000	GTE/California	1290	Other Operating Income/Losses	2014	570	
2000	GTE/California	1390	Total Non-operating Items (Exp)	295688	327	
2000	GTE/California	1490	Total Other Taxes	72279	41581	
2000	GTE/California	1590	Federal Income Taxes (Exp)	83803	100125	
2000	GTE/California	1915	Net Return	250743	210707	461450


Source: FCC website, http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/armis/db/ (except for shaded areas)

Data in shaded areas are CPUC staff calculations from table data. Net Return is calculated by adding rows 1090 and 1290 and subtracting rows 1190, 1390, 1490 and 1590.

#### **Appendix D: Verizon's Illustrations**

This appendix contains graphics created by Verizon with the intention of illustrating certain concepts. Their presentation here does not imply that the Commission necessarily agrees with these illustrations as adequate analogies for OSS processes. The analogies presented may be helpful in some contexts, but may be either inadequate and/or unhelpful in other contexts. They are presented here solely for the purpose of discussing Verizon's positions.

# Verizon's page 27 illustration:




OUT OF PARITY PROCESS FOR CLECS

CLEC SAMPLE


Verizon's page 26 illustration:

# ILEC RETAIL PROCESSES

## CLEC WHOLESALE PROCESS



# Verizon's page 25 illustration:



PARITY PROCESSES FOR ILEC AND CLEC

CLEC SAMPLE

# **Appendix E: Payment Rate Guide**

Failure	rate "F"	Payment Rate "R"				
Equal to		Minimum	Maximum			
or greater	But less	Percent of				
than	than	Cap	Cap	Formula		
0	0	0	0	n/a		
0	1	0	0	n/a		
1	2	0	0.25	R = - 0.25 + 0.25 x F		
2	3	0.25	0.5			
3	4	0.5	0.75			
4	5	0.75	1	II .		
5	6	1	1.6	R = -0.20 + 0.60 x F		
6	7	1.6	2.2	II .		
7	8	2.2	2.8	II .		
8	9	2.8	3.4	II		
9	10	3.4	4	II		
10	11	4	5	R = - 6.00 + 1.00 x F		
11	12	5	6	II		
12	13	6	7	II		
13	14	7	8	II .		
14	15	8	9	II .		
15	16	9		R = - 12.00 + 1.40 x F		
16	17	10.4	11.8			
17	18	11.8	13.2			
18	19	13.2	14.6			
19	20	14.6	16			
20	21	16		R = - 40.00 + 2.80 x F		
21	22	18.8	21.6			
22	23	21.6		II .		
23	24	24.4	27.2	II .		
24	25	27.2	30	II .		
25	26	30	32.8	II .		
26	27	32.8	35.6			
27	28	35.6		II .		
28	29	38.4		II .		
29	30	41.2	44	"		
30	31	44	46.8	"		
31	32	46.8				
32	33	49.6		11		
33	34	52.4	55.2	11		
34	35	55.2	58	11		
35	36	58	60.8			
36	37	60.8	63.6			
37	38	63.6	66.4	II		
38	39	66.4	69.2	II		
39	40	69.2	72	II.		
40	41	72	74.8	II		
41	42	74.8	77.6			
	۲∠	,	,,,,			

42	43	77.6	80.4	"
43	44	80.4	83.2	II .
44	45	83.2	86	"
45	46	86	88.8	II .
46	47	88.8	91.6	"
47	48	91.6	94.4	"
48	49	94.4	97.2	II .
49	50	97.2	100	II .
50	100	100	100	II

## **Appendix F: Individual Performance Result Payment Rate Examples**

Payment Rate Examples								
	Individual Payment Amounts							
Percentage of Failures*	Ordinary	Chronic	Extended	Tier II				
0.0 to < 1	0	0	0	0				
1.0	40	200	400	800				
5.0	200	1000	2000	4000				
10.0	400	2000	4000	8000				
20.0	800	4000	8000	16000				
30.0	1200	6000	12000	24000				
40.0	1600	8000	16000	32000				
50.0	2000	10000	20000	40000				
60.0	2000	10000	20000	40000				
70.0	2000	10000	20000	40000				
80.0	2000	10000	20000	40000				
90.0	2000	10000	20000	40000				
100.0	2000	10000	20000	40000				
4.0	160	800	1600	3200				
7.9	314	1570	3140	6280				
16.0	640	3200	6400	12800				
21.0	840	4200	8400	16800				
31.0	1240	6200	12400	24800				
41.0	1640	8200	16400	32800				
50.0	2000	10000	20000	40000				

<sup>\*</sup> Tier I rates are based on Tier I failure rates, and Tier II rates are based on Tier II failure rates.

# Appendix G: Payments Generated by Estimated Failure Rates Pacific Bell


A Failure rate 0.99% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0	rget
Note 1   Total payment   Total payment   Total payment   Total payment   Total payment   Sper failure   \$38	rget
A Failure rate	
\$ per failure       \$38       \$188       \$376       \$1,411       367         Payment       \$0       \$0       \$0       \$0       1.5%       \$0         B       Failure rate       4.0%       0.80%       0.160%       0.8000%       0.17%       0.7         \$ per failure       \$152       \$760       \$1,520       \$5,700       \$5,700       \$0.3%       0.2%       \$16,735       6.0%       \$78,649       \$343         C       Failure rate       7.0%       0.3%       0.02%       0.45%       0.25%       2.2         \$ per failure       \$266       \$1,330       \$2,660       \$9,975       \$9,975       \$16,474       10.5%       \$114,665       \$1,00         D       Failure rate       7.85%       2.12%       1.25%       6.00%       \$1,39%       2.7         Payment       \$298       \$1,492       \$2,983       \$11,186       367         Payment       \$99,356       \$134,163       \$158,211       \$246,321       11.8%       \$638,051       \$1,24         E       Failure rate       14.0%       5.0%       3.0%       7.5%       4.60%       8.6	payment
\$ per failure       \$38       \$188       \$376       \$1,411       367         Payment       \$0       \$0       \$0       \$0       1.5%       \$0         B       Failure rate       4.0%       0.80%       0.160%       0.8000%       0.17%       0.7         \$ per failure       \$152       \$760       \$1,520       \$5,700       \$5,700       \$1,520       \$1,5	00%
N	
B Failure rate \$152 \$760 \$1,520 \$5,700 \$1,520 \$5,700 \$1,330 \$2,660 \$9,975 \$16,474 \$10.5% \$114,665 \$1,000 \$16,930 \$2,983 \$11,186 \$1,000 \$13,400 \$1,492 \$2,983	
\$ per failure       \$152       \$760       \$1,520       \$5,700       \$367       \$367       \$367       \$343         Payment       \$25,797       \$25,797       \$10,319       \$16,735       6.0%       \$78,649       \$343         C       Failure rate       7.0%       0.3%       0.02%       0.45%       0.25%       2.2         \$ per failure       \$266       \$1,330       \$2,660       \$9,975       \$367       \$16,474       \$10.5%       \$114,665       \$1,00         D       Failure rate       7.85%       2.12%       1.25%       6.00%       \$1.39%       2.7         \$ per failure       \$298       \$1,492       \$2,983       \$11,186       \$367       \$638,051       \$1,24         Payment       \$99,356       \$134,163       \$158,211       \$246,321       \$1.8%       \$638,051       \$1,24         E       Failure rate       14.0%       5.0%       3.0%       7.5%       4.60%       8.0	\$O
\$ per failure	
\$ per failure	7E0/
N         4243         4243         4243         367         \$10,319         \$16,735         6.0%         \$78,649         \$343           C         Failure rate \$25,797         \$25,797         \$10,319         \$16,735         6.0%         \$78,649         \$343           C         Failure rate \$266         \$1,330         \$2,660         \$9,975         \$9,975         \$9,975         \$16,474         \$10.5%         \$114,665         \$1,00           D         Failure rate \$7,85%         \$2,12%         \$1,25%         \$6.00%         \$1,39%         \$2.7           \$ per failure \$298         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$11,186         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$638,051         \$1,24           Payment         \$99,356         \$134,163         \$158,211         \$246,321         \$1.8%         \$638,051         \$1,24           E         Failure rate         \$14.0%         \$5.0%         3.0%         7.5%         4.60%         8.0	73%
C         Failure rate \$25,797         \$25,797         \$10,319         \$16,735         6.0%         \$78,649         \$343           C         Failure rate \$per failure \$266         \$1,330         \$2,660         \$9,975         \$9,975         \$10,474         \$10.5%         \$114,665         \$1,00           D         Failure rate \$298         \$16,930         \$2,257         \$16,474         \$10.5%         \$114,665         \$1,00           D         Failure rate \$298         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$11,186         \$11,186         \$11,186         \$1,424         \$1,424         \$243         \$243         \$246,321         \$11.8%         \$638,051         \$1,24           E         Failure rate         \$14.0%         \$5.0%         \$3.0%         7.5%         4.60%         8.0	
\$ per failure         \$266         \$1,330         \$2,660         \$9,975         367           Payment         \$79,005         \$16,930         \$2,257         \$16,474         10.5%         \$114,665         \$1,00           D         Failure rate         7.85%         2.12%         1.25%         6.00%         1.39%         2.7           \$ per failure         \$298         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$1,186         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$1,24         <	3,787
\$ per failure         \$266         \$1,330         \$2,660         \$9,975         367           Payment         \$79,005         \$16,930         \$2,257         \$16,474         10.5%         \$114,665         \$1,00           D         Failure rate         7.85%         2.12%         1.25%         6.00%         1.39%         2.7           \$ per failure         \$298         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$1,186         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$1,24         <	
\$ per failure         \$266         \$1,330         \$2,660         \$9,975         367           Payment         \$79,005         \$16,930         \$2,257         \$16,474         10.5%         \$114,665         \$1,00           D         Failure rate         7.85%         2.12%         1.25%         6.00%         1.39%         2.7           \$ per failure         \$298         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$1,186         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         \$1,24         <	2001
N         4243         4243         4243         367         \$16,474         10.5%         \$114,665         \$1,00           D         Failure rate \$7.85%         2.12%         1.25%         6.00%         1.39%         2.7           \$ per failure \$298         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186         367         7         8638,051         \$1,24           Payment         \$99,356         \$134,163         \$158,211         \$246,321         11.8%         \$638,051         \$1,24           E         Failure rate         14.0%         5.0%         3.0%         7.5%         4.60%         8.0	20%
Payment         \$79,005         \$16,930         \$2,257         \$16,474         10.5%         \$114,665         \$1,00           D         Failure rate \$ per failure N         7.85%         2.12%         1.25%         6.00%         1.39%         2.7           \$ per failure N         \$298 4243         \$1,492 4243         \$2,983 4243         \$11,186 367         367         1.39%         \$638,051         \$1,24           Payment         \$99,356         \$134,163         \$158,211         \$246,321         11.8%         \$638,051         \$1,24           E         Failure rate         14.0%         5.0%         3.0%         7.5%         4.60%         8.0	
D Failure rate 7.85% 2.12% 1.25% 6.00% 1.39% 2.7   \$ per failure \$298 \$1,492 \$2,983 \$11,186 \$367 \$134,163 \$158,211 \$246,321 \$11.8% \$638,051 \$1,24	08,442
\$ per failure         \$298         \$1,492         \$2,983         \$11,186           N         4243         4243         4243         367           Payment         \$99,356         \$134,163         \$158,211         \$246,321         11.8%         \$638,051         \$1,24           E         Failure rate         14.0%         5.0%         3.0%         7.5%         4.60%         8.0	,
\$ per failure       \$298       \$1,492       \$2,983       \$11,186         N       4243       4243       4243       367         Payment       \$99,356       \$134,163       \$158,211       \$246,321       11.8%       \$638,051       \$1,24         E       Failure rate       14.0%       5.0%       3.0%       7.5%       4.60%       8.0	
N 4243 4243 4243 367 Payment \$99,356 \$134,163 \$158,211 \$246,321 11.8% \$638,051 \$1,24	71%
Payment         \$99,356         \$134,163         \$158,211         \$246,321         11.8%         \$638,051         \$1,24           E         Failure rate         14.0%         5.0%         3.0%         7.5%         4.60%         8.0	
E Failure rate 14.0% 5.0% 3.0% 7.5% 4.60% 8.0	12 217
	+2,217
	00%
\$ per failure \$532 \$2,660 \$5,320 \$19,950	
N 4243 4243 4243 367 Payment \$316,019 \$564,319 \$677,183 \$549,124 21.0% \$2,106,644 \$3,66	67,061
1 ayment \$510,019 \$504,515 \$617,165 \$545,124 \$21.076 \$42,100,044 \$5,00	37,001
F         Failure rate         14.0%         7.5%         4.5%         11.3%         6.55%         8.0	00%
\$ per failure \$532 \$2,660 \$5,320 \$19,950	
N 4243 4243 4243 367	
Payment \$316,019 \$846,479 \$1,015,774 \$823,686 21.0% \$3,001,957 \$3,66	27 004
	67,061
	67,061
\$ per failure \$874 \$4,370 \$8,740 \$32,775	67,061 40%
N 4243 4243 4243 367 Payment \$852,928 \$2,039,610 \$2,966,706 \$1,984,690 34.5% \$7,843,934 \$11,1	
1 ayrıletit   \$002,320   \$2,003,010   \$2,300,700   \$1,304,030   54.076   \$7,643,934   \$11,1	40%
	40%
\$ per failure \$874 \$4,370 \$8,740 \$32,775	40%
N 4243 4243 4243 367  Paymont \$952,028 \$2,050,415 \$4,450,058 \$2,077,025 34,5% \$11,230,427 \$11,1	40% 84,535
Payment \$852,928 \$3,059,415 \$4,450,058 \$2,977,035 34.5% \$11,339,437 \$11,1	40% 84,535

Pacific Be	ell - continued	d		Monthly Cap		\$45,838,260		
	Base	Failure Type						
Example	\$38	Ordinary	Chronic	Extended	Tier II		Estimated	Target
						Note 1	Total payment	Total payment
1	Failure rate	38.0%	21.0%	14.0%	31.5%		51.48%	66.40%
	\$ per failure	\$1,444	\$7,220	\$14,440	\$54,150			
	N	4243	4243	4243	367			
	Payment	\$2,328,219	\$6,433,237	\$8,577,649	\$6,260,011	57.0%	\$23,599,115	\$30,436,605
J	Failure rate	38.0%	31.5%	21.0%	47.3%		74.69%	66.40%
	\$ per failure	\$1,444	\$7,220	\$14,440	\$54,150			
	N	4243	4243	4243	367			
	Payment	\$2,328,219	\$9,649,855	\$12,866,473	\$9,390,016	57.0%	\$34,234,563	\$30,436,605
K	Failure rate	50.0%	29.0%	19.7%	38.0%		90.62%	100.00%
	\$ per failure	\$1,900	\$9,500	\$19,000	\$71,250			
	N	4243	4243	4243	367			
	Payment	\$4,030,850	\$11,689,465	\$15,881,549	\$9,936,525	75.0%	\$41,538,389	\$45,838,260
		50.00/	0.4.50/	04.00/	47.00/		100.000/	400.000/
L	Failure rate	50.0%	31.5%	21.0%	47.3%		100.38%	100.00%
	\$ per failure	\$1,900	\$9,500	\$19,000	\$71,250			
	N	4243	4243	4243	367		*	
	Payment	\$4,030,850	\$12,697,178	\$16,929,570	\$12,355,284	75.0%	\$46,012,882	\$45,838,260

Note: The shaded areas contain estimates based on Pacific Bell's simulations. The non-shaded areas are estimates based on historical data, and reflect a higher incidence of repeated failures than the simulations. Example D was estimated from Pacific's actual performance results for March, 2001.

Comparison of Estimated versus Targeted Percentage Payment of Total Payment Cap as a Function of Failure Rate
Simulated Data for Pacific Bell Results

Page 3




### Verizon

Verizon					Monthly Cap		\$13,843,500	
	Base		F	ailure Type	,			
Example	\$23	Ordinary	Chronic	Extended	Tier	I	Estimated	Target
						Note 1	Total payment	Total payment
Α	Failure rate	0.99%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.00%	0.00%
	\$ per failure	\$23	\$114	\$228	\$854			
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$0	1.5%	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0
В	Failure rate	4.0%	0.8%	0.16%	0.8%		0.17%	0.75%
В	\$ per failure	\$92	\$460	\$920	\$3,450		0.17 /0	0.7376
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$7,982	\$7,982	\$3,193	\$4,140	6.0%	\$23,297	\$103,826
				, , ,				
С	Failure rate	7.0%	0.3%	0.02%	0.45%		0.25%	2.20%
	\$ per failure	\$161	\$805	\$1,610	\$6,038			
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$24,445	\$5,238	\$698	\$4,075	10.5%	\$34,456	\$304,557
D	Failure rate	13.00%	6.00%	3.00%	10.00%		4.63%	7.00%
	\$ per failure	\$299	\$1,495	\$2,990	\$11,213		4.03 /6	7.0076
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$84,309	\$194,559	\$194,559	\$168,188	19.5%	\$641,615	\$969,049
	,	<b>4</b> 0 1,000	<b>*</b> 10 1,000	<b>*</b> 10 1,000	<b>+</b> 100,100		<b>~</b> = 1.7, = 1.5	<b>*</b>
Е	Failure rate	14.0%	5.0%	3.0%	7.5%		4.46%	8.00%
	\$ per failure	\$322	\$1,610	\$3,220	\$12,075			
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$97,779	\$174,605	\$209,525	\$135,844	21.0%	\$617,752	\$1,107,480
F	Failure rate	14.0%	7.5%	4.5%	11.3%		6.34%	8.00%
'	\$ per failure	\$322	\$1,610	\$3,220	\$12,075		0.5470	0.0070
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$97,779	\$261,907	\$314,288	\$203,766	21.0%	\$877,739	\$1,107,480
		, ,	, ,	,	, ,		. ,	
G	Failure rate	23.0%	11.0%	8.0%	16.5%		14.04%	24.40%
	\$ per failure	\$529	\$2,645	\$5,290	\$19,838			
	N Payment	2169 \$263,002	2169 \$631,071	2169 \$917,921	40 \$130,928	34.5%	¢1 0/12 924	\$3,377,814
	Payment	\$263,902	φυσ1,071	कुन १७८१	\$130,928	34.5%	\$1,943,821	φ3,311,014
Н	Failure rate	23.0%	16.5%	12.0%	24.8%		24.01%	24.40%
	\$ per failure	\$529	\$2,645	\$5,290	\$19,838			
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$263,902	\$946,606	\$1,376,881	\$736,467	34.5%	\$3,323,856	\$3,377,814

Verizon					Monthly Cap		\$13,843,500	
	Base		F	ailure Type				
Example	\$23	Ordinary	Chronic	Extended	Tier II		Estimated	Target
						Note 1	Total payment	Total payment
1	Failure rate	38.0%	21.0%	14.0%	31.5%		49.94%	66.40%
	\$ per failure	\$874	\$4,370	\$8,740	\$32,775			
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$720,368	\$1,990,491	\$2,653,988	\$1,548,619	57.0%	\$6,913,467	\$9,192,084
J	Failure rate	38.0%	31.5%	21.0%	47.3%		72.31%	66.40%
	\$ per failure	\$874	\$4,370	\$8,740	\$32,775			
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			<b>**</b> *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
	Payment	\$720,368	\$2,985,737	\$3,980,983	\$2,322,928	57.0%	\$10,010,016	\$9,192,084
K	Failure rate	50.0%	29.0%	19.7%	38.0%		88.39%	100.00%
	\$ per failure	\$1,150	\$5,750	\$11,500	\$43,125			
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$1,247,175	\$3,616,808	\$4,913,870	\$2,458,125	75.0%	\$12,235,977	\$13,843,500
	-							
L	Failure rate	50.0%	31.5%	21.0%	47.3%		97.30%	100.00%
	\$ per failure	\$1,150	\$5,750	\$11,500	\$43,125			
	N	2169	2169	2169	150			
	Payment	\$1,247,175	\$3,928,601	\$5,238,135	\$3,056,484	75.0%	\$13,470,396	\$13,843,500


Note: The shaded areas contain estimates of Verizon's performance based on Pacific Bell's simulations. The non-shaded areas are estimates based on historical data, and reflect a higher incidence of repeated failures than the simulations. Example D was estimated from Verizon's actual performance results for December, 2000


# Comparison of Estimated versus Targeted Percentage Payment of Total Payment Cap as a Function of Failure Rate Simulated Data for Verizon Results




# Appendix H: Failure Rates and Payments in Texas and New York


Verizon New York
Market Adjustment Summary
Total Payment Amounts and Percent Missed Metrics











### Appendix I: Workpaper #13, April 2, 2001, R.97-10-016/I.97-10-017.

This document was received as an e-mail. The "Sent" date is not correct, and is apparently an automatic-dating error.

----Original Message----

From: Faye Raynor [mailto:faye.raynor@telops.gte.com]

Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 1969 4:00 PM

To: jmgibson@newpointgroup.com; jar@cpuc.ca.gov Cc: stephen.vivien@wcom.com; gsjohns@pacbell.com Subject: Measures Excluded from Incentive Plan

The CLECs, Pacific Bell and GTE reached an agreement in mid-1999 that several of the performance measures included for reporting under the Stipulated Agreement were duplicative in nature and would not be subject to penalty assessment. This agreement was memorialized in 1) February technical workshops on incentives (PB/CLECs) and subsequent briefs filed March 22, 1999 and 2)the GTE/CLEC OSS Incentive Technical Workshop held July 13-14, 1999 and subsequent briefs. The measures with industry agreement identified for penalty exclusion were:

Measurement 8 - Percent Completed Within Standard Interval

Measurement 12 - Percent of Due Dates Missed Due To Lack of Facilities

Measurement 13 - Delay Order Interval to Completion Date (For Lack of

Facilities)

Measurement 22 - POTS Out of Service Less than 24 Hours

Additionally, submeasures identified for exclusion were:

Measurement 3 - Error Types (Syntax and content)

Measurement 5 - Jeopardy Type (lack of facilities and other)

Measurement 6 - Jeopardy Type (lack of facilities and other)

Measurement 34 - Charge Type (Usage, Recurring, NonRecurring)

The Parties also agreed this list of excluded measurements is subject to review on a periodic basis after incentive plan implementation.

faye h. raynor Manager-Performance Measures Integration 972-718-8897

### **Appendix J: California Performance Incentives Plan**

### 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

- 1.1 The Performance Incentive Plan (hereafter the *Incentive Plan*) consists of the following elements: (1) a collection of measures that assess service delivery; (2) a set of testing rules for deciding whether service delivery is in parity (where there are retail analogues) or in compliance (where there are benchmarks); (3) a mechanism for calculating incentive payments for those sub-measures found to be out of parity or out of compliance; (4) a specification of the payment amounts to be paid for out-of-parity or non-compliant performance; (5) a provision for Absolute and Procedural caps on payments; and (6) a provision for Root Cause analysis that can excuse service delivery failures that were outside the control of the Pacific Bell or Verizon.
- 1.2 **Performance Measures.** The performance measures used in the Incentive Plan are specified in the Performance Measurements Joint Partial Settlement Agreement (JPSA) as amended by D.01-05-087. Payments apply to those non-diagnostic sub-measures designated in Section 5 herein that have data for a given month when Pacific Bell or Verizon delivers out-of-parity or non-compliant performance.
- 1.3 **Testing Rules.** The rules for assessing whether specific sub-measures are out-of-parity or non-compliant are applied from the CPUC's *Interim Opinion on Performance Incentives*, D.01-01-037 (OSS OII R. 97-10-016, I. 97-10-017) issued on January 18, 2001, with the following exceptions: (1) an additive constant will be used for all log transformations, (2) the Modified t-test will be applied to Measure 44 without log transformations, and (3) the Fisher's Exact Test will be used for all percentage-based results regardless of sample size
- 1.4 **Incentive Payment Calculations.** Incentive payment calculations are applied to those performance results for each month that are deemed to be out-of-parity or non-compliant.
- 1.5 **Incentive Payment Amounts.** The size of the incentive payments depends on performance failure pervasiveness (that is, the number of performance failures affecting a CLEC), and whether performance failures are repeated. The incentive amounts increase as the number of performance failures increase or as they are repeated.
- 1.6 **Absolute and Procedural Caps.** In any month, the following caps on payments apply: (1) a procedural cap of \$15,000,000 for Pacific Bell for

all CLECs.; (2) a procedural cap of \$4,500,000 for Verizon for all CLECs, and (3) an absolute monthly cap of 1/12 of 36% of annual net revenue from local exchange service for both Pacific Bell and Verizon. Using the same methodology that was used to determine these amounts, these amounts will be updated to reflect new ARMIS data published each year.

1.7 **Root Cause Analysis.** A procedure for Root Cause Analysis and subsequent action is included.

### 2. THE ASSESSMENT OF PARITY AND COMPLIANCE

2.1 The specific mechanism for assessing parity and compliance depends on the classification of the sub-measure being assessed. Sub-measures can be classified according to four dimensions: (1) the *type* of the comparison: parity where there is a retail analogue or benchmarks where no retail analogues are available or feasible, (2) the *basis* for the measurement: averages, percentages (proportions), rates, indices, or counts; (3) the *direction* of good service: either high values or low values; and (4) the *applicability of small sample aggregation rules*. The table below gives a summary of the tests that are applied to sub-measures according to their first two dimensions. These tests are described in more detail below.

# 2.2 Statistical Criteria for Deciding Parity.

- *2.2.1.* A statistical test is applied that yields a probability of the data given the null hypothesis of parity. Except where different critical alpha levels are applied conditionally, a sub-measure will be deemed out of parity (i.e., the sub-measure *fails*) if the probability is less than 10% (0.10 critical alpha). Otherwise the sub-measure *passes*.
- 2.2.2. Under the following conditions, the sub-measure will be deemed out of parity if the probability is less than 20% (0.20 critical alpha level): (1) When sample sizes are less than 30 for single-month individual CLEC tests where the aggregate sub-measure test indicates non-parity, and (2) for all tests for repeated failures.
- 2.2.3. Under the following conditions, the sub-measure will be deemed out of parity if the probability is less than 5% (0.05 critical alpha level): (1) When sample sizes are 100 or greater for single-month individual CLEC tests where the aggregate sub-measure test

indicates parity, and (2) when single-month sample sizes are  $500\ \mathrm{or}$  greater.

2.3. Statistical tests shall be applied as specified in the Interim Opinion, D.01-01-037, unless otherwise specified herein. The test applications are summarized in the following table:

Testing Procedures Applied to Sub-measures According to their Basis and Type			
Basis	Parity	Benchmarks	
Averages	Modified <i>t</i> -test applied to the logs of the data except for Measure 34 for which the test is applied to the raw data.	Benchmark is used as an absolute comparison standard	
Percentage	Fisher's exact test applied to all submeasures.	Small Sample Adjustment table is applied were applicable, otherwise the benchmark is used as an absolute standard.	
Rates	Binomial test applied to all sub-measures	Benchmark is used as an absolute standard	
Index	The performance difference is compared to an absolute standard	No sub-measures of this kind	
Count	No sub-measures of this kind	The CLEC numerator is compared to the benchmark as an absolute standard. Applicable to LNP sub-measures in Measures 20 and 23.	

### 3. CALCULATION OF INCENTIVE VALUES

3.1 The assessment of incentive payments for non-compliance is performed in four ways: (1) on a CLEC-by-CLEC basis, each month, by examining all the sub-measures "touched" by an individual CLEC (hereafter the *portfolio of touched sub-measures*) that do not fall into the specialized categories discussed below, (2) on a small sample aggregate basis, each month, for those sub-measures to which the small sample aggregation

rules adopted in D.01-01-037 are applied, (3) on an industry aggregate basis, each month, for those sub-measures covering processes that only involve computer processing and are therefore designed to automatically provide parity (covered by Measures 1, 24, 38, 42, and 44, and the *fully-electronic* sub-measures of 2, 3, and 18), and (4) on an industry aggregate basis, each month, for those parity measures that have chronic conditional failures. The calculation and assessment of incentive amounts are different for each of these four categories of sub-measures. Categories 1, 2, and 3 are termed Tier I categories. Tier I payments are made to the CLECs. Category 4 is termed Tier II, and payments are made to the ratepayers.

- 3.2 A base amount (*BA*) of \$38 will be used as a starting point for calculating Pacific Bell's payment amounts.
- 3.3 A base amount (*BA*) of \$23 will be used as a starting point for calculating Verizon's payment amounts.
- 3.4 Actual payment amounts will be calculated using an adjusted base amount. The base amount (BA) will be adjusted according to the total number of observations (total number of sub-measure performance results for all CLECs) each month. The adjusted base amount (ABA) will be determined by the following formula: ABA = BA x (total number of observations listed for each ILEC in Appendix G / current total number of observations for each ILEC), rounded to the closest dollar. For example, if in a future month Pacific had a 5000 observation total, then the adjusted base amount would be \$38 x (4243/5000) = \$32.
- 3.5 **Category 1.** In this category there is a portfolio of touched submeasures for each CLEC. The following description applies to this portfolio for a single CLEC.
  - 3.5.1 **Ordinary Failures.** To calculate payments for *Ordinary Failures*, the following steps are required for each CLEC.
    - 3.5.1.1 Calculate the size of the portfolio of touched submeasures for each CLEC. Those sub-measures that fall into Categories 2 and 3 are excluded in calculating the size of the CLEC's portfolio of touched sub-measures.
    - 3.5.1.2 Determine the CLEC's portfolio failure rate in percentage points by calculating its percentage of touched sub-measures that failed the statistical tests.

3.5.1.3 The amount paid to the CLEC is then determined by multiplying its *Ordinary Failure* rate percentage points by the adjusted base amount. (E.g., with a \$40 adjusted base amount and a 12% *Ordinary Failure* rate:  $12 \times ABA = \$480$ .)

- 3.5.2 **Chronic Failures.** Sub-measure failures that occur for three or more consecutive months are called *Chronic Failures*. The procedure for *Chronic Failures* is similar to that for Ordinary failures.
  - 3.5.2.1 Determine the number of *Chronic Failures* for each CLEC.
  - 3.5.2.2 The amount paid to the CLEC is then determined by multiplying the *Ordinary Failure* payment amount by five (5). (E.g., with a \$40 adjusted base amount and a 12% *Ordinary Failure* rate, 12 x \$40 x 5 = \$2400).
  - 3.5.2.3 To identify *Chronic Failures* for the first two months of implementation, performance results from the CLEC's current month and two previous months will be used.
  - 3.5.2.4 Except where there are three consecutive months of inactivity by a CLEC, the months immediately preceding and following a month without individual or aggregate OSS sub-measure activity by that CLEC, will be considered consecutive months for the purposes of identifying *Chronic Failures*.
- 3.5.3 **Extended Failures.** Sub-measure failures for five or six out of six consecutive months are called *Extended Failures*.
  - 3.5.3.1 To identify *Extended Failures* for the first five months of implementation, performance results from the current month and the five previous months will be used.
  - 3.5.3.2 The amount paid to the CLEC for *Extended Failures* is determined by multiplying the *Ordinary Failure* payment amount by ten (10). (E.g., with a \$40 adjusted base amount and a 12% *Ordinary Failure* rate,  $12 \times $40 \times 10 = $4800$ ).

3.5.3.3 Except where there are three consecutive months of inactivity by a CLEC, the months immediately preceding and following a month without individual or aggregate OSS sub-measure activity by that CLEC, will be considered consecutive months for the purposes of identifying *Extended Failures*.

- 3.6 Category 2 (Small Sample Aggregates). All those sub-measures producing Small Sample Aggregates are treated as a single portfolio. The procedure for determining incentive payments for this portfolio is as follows.
  - 3.6.1 Calculate the size of the portfolio for the Small Sample Aggregates.
  - 3.6.2 Determine the percentage of failures.
  - 3.6.3 The number of percentage points is then multiplied by one-half the base amount to get the size of the incentive payment for the Small Sample Aggregate. This payment is then paid to each CLEC that participates in any of the Small Sample Aggregates and has performance worse than the ILEC. In the case of average-based parity measures, the comparison is based on the mean of the log-transformed scores.
  - 3.6.4 A CLEC is eligible for a *Chronic* or *Extended Failures* payment if its performance has been worse than the ILEC's performance for the necessary number of months regardless of whether its performance was assessed separately or as part of a small sample aggregate.
  - 3.6.5 *Chronic* and *Extended Failures* payment amounts are five (5) and ten (10) times the small sample aggregate single-month failure payment amounts.
- 3.7 Category 3 (Industry Aggregates). All those sub-measures that fall under treatment as an Industry Aggregate are considered as a single portfolio. The procedure for determining incentive payments for this portfolio is as follows.
  - 3.7.1 Calculate the size of the portfolio for the Industry Aggregates for:
    - 3.7.1.1 Performance Measures 1, 24, 38, 42, and 44 (all submeasures).

3.7.1.2 Performance Measures 2 and 3, all sub-measures where orders are electronically received *and* electronically handled.

- 3.7.1.3 Performance Measure 18, Sub-measures 1800101 (LEX/EDI LASR), 180201 (LEX/EDI CLEO), 1800502 (LEX/EDI LASR not reported by DSS), and 1800503 (LEX/EDI CLEO not reported by DSS), only.
- 3.7.2 Determine the number of failures.
- 3.7.3 The incentive amount is then determined by multiplying the failure rate percentage points times the base amount and then times 50 for *Chronic Failures* and 100 for *Extended Failures*.
- 3.7.4 The sum of all payments for Industry Aggregate submeasures is divided equally among all CLECs who qualify for incentive payments.
- 3.8 Category 4 (Tier II). Each parity sub-measure is aggregated on an industry basis and the set of aggregated sub-measures is considered as a single portfolio. The aggregate sub-measures are tested using the same procedures as for individual CLEC parity tests.
  - 3.8.1 Calculate the size of the portfolio for the Tier II Industry Aggregates.
  - 3.8.2 Determine the number of Category 4 single-month failures.
  - 3.8.3 Determine the failure rate percentage points. (E.g., 0.15 = 15 percent = 15 percentage points.)
  - 3.8.4 Determine the number of sub-measures that have failed the current month and the previous two months.
  - 3.8.5 The payment amount for each failed sub-measure is then determined by multiplying the Industry Aggregate singlemonth failure rate percentage points by the base amount (e.g., with a \$40 base amount and a 5 percent failure rate:  $15 \times BA = $600$ ), and then by 25.
  - 3.8.6 To identify Tier II failures for the first two months of implementation, performance results from the current month and the two previous months will be used.
  - 3.8.7 Except where there are three consecutive months of inactivity, the months immediately preceding and following a month without CLEC aggregate OSS sub-measure activity will be

- considered consecutive months for the purposes of identifying Tier II failures.
- 3.8.8 Payments calculated for this category are paid to the ratepayers as follows:
  - 3.8.8.1 Pacific and Verizon shall deposit Tier II incentive payments monthly into an interest-bearing memorandum account with a monthly-compounded interest rate equal to the tariffed rate the respective ILEC's charge their customers for late payment.
  - 3.8.8.2 Each ILEC shall be responsible for maintaining these performance incentive accounts, which will be subject to audit by Commission staff.
  - 3.8.8.3 When the annual Price Cap filings are made and the surcharge and surcredit amounts are calculated, the most recent twelve-month's incentive payments (August of the previous year through July of the current year) shall be added to the surcredit amounts included in Pacific's Rule 33 (Schedule Cal. P.U.C. No. A2.1.33) and Verizon's Tariff 38 (Schedule Cal. P.U.C. No. 38) disbursement mechanisms.
  - 3.8.8.4 Interest shall accrue beginning with the first monthly incentive payment due date and shall continue to accrue on all amounts not yet credited to the ratepayers.
  - 3.8.8.5 Pacific Bell shall identify in its Intrastate Earnings Monitoring Report (IEMR), NRF monitoring report code PD-01-27, an adjustment clearly identifying the annual performance incentive payments. This adjustment shall remove from the California intrastate results of operations, and the earnings monitoring reports, the payments made to the memorandum account.
  - 3.8.8.6 Verizon shall identify in its Recorded and Adjusted Separated Results of Operations Report, NRF monitoring report code GD-04-01, an adjustment clearly identifying the annual performance incentive payments. This adjustment shall remove from the California intrastate results of operations, and the

earnings monitoring reports, the payments made to the memorandum account.

### 5. SPECIFIC MEASURES TO WHICH INCENTIVE PAYMENTS APPLY

Payments for Pacific Bell's failure to meet specified performance measures will only apply to the Specified Measures listed below:

## 5.2 **Pre-Ordering**

Measure 1-Average Response Time (to Pre-Order Queries)

### 5.3 **Ordering**

Measure 2 - Average FOC Notice Interval

Measure 3 - Average Reject Notice Interval

• For Measure 3, remedies will be paid on the service group type disaggregations only. Error type levels of disaggregation will be reported diagnostically, and not subject to incentive payments.

Measure 4 - Percentage of Flow Through (once measures of success are ordered for this measure by the Commission)

## 5.4 **Provisioning**

Measure 5 - Percentage of Orders Jeopardized

Measure 6 - Average Jeopardy Notice Interval

Measure 7 - Average Completed Interval

Measure 9 - Coordinated Customer Conversion as a Percentage On-Time

Measure 9A - Frame Due Time Conversions as a Percentage On-Time

Measure 10 -LNP Network Provisioning

Measure 11 - Percent of Due Dates Missed

Measure 14 - Held Order Interval

Measure 15 - Provisioning Trouble Reports (Prior to Service Order Completion)

Measure 16 - Percent Troubles in 30 Days for New Orders (Specials)

Measure 17 - Percent Troubles in 10 Days for New Orders (Non-Specials)

Measure 18 - Average Completion Notice Interval

#### 5.5 **Maintenance**

Measure 19 - Customer Trouble Report Rate

Measure 20 - Percent of Customer Trouble Not Resolved Within Estimated Time

Measure 21 - Average Time to Restore

Measure 23 - Frequency of Repeat Troubles in 30 Day Period

### 5.6 **Network Performance**

Measure 24 - Percent Blocking on Common Trunks

Measure 25 - Percent Blocking on Interconnection Trunks

Measure 26 -NXX Loaded by LERG Effective Date

### 5.7 **Billing**

Measure 28 - Usage Timeliness

Measure 29 - Accuracy of Usage Feed

Measure 30 - Wholesale Bill Timeliness

Measure 31 - Usage Completeness

Measure 32 - Recurring Charge Completeness

Measure 33 - Non-Recurring Charge Completeness

Measure 34 - Bill Accuracy

 For Measure 34, incentive payments will be paid on the service group type disaggregations only. Charge types will be reported diagnostically, and will be not subject to incentive payments.

Measure 35 - Billing Completion Notice Interval

Measure 36 - Accuracy of Mechanized Bill Feed

# 5.8 **Database Updates**

Measure 37 - Average Database Update Interval

Measure 38 - Percent Database Accuracy

Measure 39 - E911/911 MS Database Update Average

# 5.9 Collocation

Measure 40 - Average Time to Respond to a Collocation Request

Measure 41 - Average Time to Provide a Collocation Arrangement

## 5.10 Interfaces

Measure 42 - Percentage of Time Interface is Available

Measure 44 - Center Responsiveness

### **6. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS**

6.1 Pacific Bell may use Root Cause Analysis to demonstrate that an apparent out-of-parity condition was attributable to an atypical event beyond the reasonable control of Pacific Bell. The list of "excludable events" that could be considered as part of Pacific Bell's Root Cause Analysis is reflected in Exhibit 1 hereto. In addition, the following provisions apply to Root Cause Analysis:

- 6.2 Where performance data suggests an out-of-parity condition exists, Pacific Bell may use Root Cause Analysis to demonstrate there was no discriminatory treatment (the situations in which Pacific Bell may invoke Root Cause Analysis referred to as "excludable events" are reflected in Exhibit 1). When Root Cause Analysis is invoked, Pacific Bell will have the burden of proving that but for the occurrence of an "exclusion event" Pacific Bell would have succeeded on the measure in question.
- 6.3 If a dispute arises over whether Pacific Bell's Root Cause Analysis is sufficient to excuse an apparent out-of-parity condition, the Parties will first attempt to resolve the disagreement through an informal discussion. Pacific Bell will prepare a Root Cause Analysis report and provide it to any affected CLEC. If the Parties agree that the Root Cause Analysis report is sufficient to excuse Pacific Bell, the Parties will sign the report and Pacific Bell will be relieved from any associated payments. If CLEC does not accept Pacific Bell's Root Cause Analysis, the Parties agree to seek resolution by the Commission.
- 6.4 Pending the resolution of any dispute, Pacific Bell shall place the payments in an interest-bearing escrow account. The funds in question will be transferred to the CLEC when and if it is determined through the EDR process that Pacific's Root Cause Analysis is not sufficient to excuse Pacific Bell.
- 6.5 Exhibit 1 identifies the categories of events that may form the basis of Root Cause Analysis and provides examples of the types of events within each category. The list is only illustrative; it is not definitive.
- 6.6 Force majeure events will be treated as excludable events for benchmark performance measures.
- 6.7 Pacific Bell will provide to the CLEC, at the time of submitting a Root Cause Analysis report to the CLEC, all non-confidential documents that were used as part of Pacific Bell's Root Cause Analysis.

6.8 Inadequate forecasts shall also be treated as an excludable event. Pacific Bell may demonstrate as part of its Root Cause Analysis that but for the inadequate forecast provided by CLEC, Pacific Bell would have complied with the performance measure at issue. Exhibit 2 hereto provides the terms of the forecasting exclusion.

6.9 Delays or other problems resulting from actions of a Service Bureau Provider acting on the CLEC's behalf for connection to Pacific Bell's OSS, including Service Bureau Provider provided processes, services, systems or connectivity shall be treated as excludable events.

### 7. PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE PAYMENTS PAYMENTS

# 7.1 Payments/Credits

- **7.1.1 Schedule.** Pacific Bell will make payments on or before the 30th day following the due date of the performance report for the month in which the obligation arose.
- 7.1.2 Absolute and Procedural Caps. In any given month, the payment to CLECs shall not exceed the following amounts. When the limit is reached, payments shall be prorated among the CLECs in the amounts proportional to what they would otherwise be entitled to collect absent a cap: 1) a procedural cap of \$15,000,000 (Pacific) and \$4,500,000 (Verizon) for all CLECs; 2) an absolute cap of 1/12 of 36% of annual net revenue from local exchange service. If a procedural cap is reached in a month, the Commission should conduct a hearing to determine whether it would be reasonable under the circumstances, and in light of the evidence, to require Pacific to pay any amounts in excess of the procedural caps. If the procedural cap is met, the amounts owed up to the cap will be prorated among the CLECs to whom incentive payments are owed and will be paid regardless of the outcome of the hearing.
- **7.1.3 Eligibility.** Only CLECs who have submitted orders for services to Pacific during the month under report shall be eligible for incentive payments.

### **EXHIBIT 1**

### **FACTUAL ANALYSIS**

The following incidences are reasonable exceptions that can be used to mitigate a statistical finding of out-of-parity (or benchmark miss) provided that the incident impacted the CLEC to such a degree as to make otherwise compliant performance non-compliant:

- I. Significant activity by a third party external to Pacific Bell\* (not controllable by Pacific Bell)
  - A. Damage to facilities:
    - major cable cuts
    - gas/water main break
    - manhole/structure fire
    - central office/facilities fires not caused or under control of Pacific Bell
    - other damage to facilities cause by a third party
  - B. Failure of third party systems
    - LNP-service degradation/out-of-service of NPAC
  - C. Threats to personal safety
    - Bomb threat causing evacuation of a Pacific Bell building (service center, central office, etc.)
    - Other threats to personal safety which impact the execution of Pacific Bell's activities on behalf of the CLEC
- II. Environmental events not considered force majeure

A. Environmental events causing service center evacuation/building condemnation

- building fire
- building damage cause by external force
- hazardous condition (gas or chemical leaks, presence of hazardous material)
- III. Failure of CLEC process/system or those of a third party vendor, including a Service Bureau Provider, acting on behalf of CLEC
  - A. CLEC ordering system with degraded service or out-of-service for an extended period of time, resulting in:
    - a backlog of requests sent all at once
    - the CLEC changing from electronic transmission to manual (fax) for duration of the outage
  - B. Chronic, severely impaired testing capabilities on part of CLECs
  - C. Chronic failure on the part of the CLEC to provision their own network in a timely manner in establishing new or migrated end user service which also involves activities on the part of Pacific

\*Note: Pacific Bell's sub-contractors or other Pacific Bell agents are not considered an external third party.

#### **EXHIBIT 2**

#### FORECASTING PLAN

CLECs shall submit forecasts to Pacific Bell for the following categories of products/services:

- Collocation
- Interconnection Trunks
- Service Requests by:
  - Resale
    - Non-designed
    - Designed
  - UNE
    - Loops
      - Non-designed
      - Designed
    - Loop/Port Combinations
    - Unbundled Transport
- Forecasts shall cover a six-month period (two quarters) and shall be submitted one quarter in advance of the commencement of the sixmonth period.
  - Forecasts may be updated quarterly, or sooner, if the CLEC determines that conditions warrant an update.
    - For example, a forecast of 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2001 must be submitted by March 31, 2001. However, the 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter forecast may be updated as part of the quarterly submission on or before June 30, 2001 (which covers 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2001 and 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2002).
  - For Service Request forecasts, forecasts shall be submitted on a statewide basis. For Interconnection forecasts, forecasts shall be submitted by wire center. Tandem interconnection shall be by tandem with identification of estimated traffic to and from subtending end offices.
  - For collocation, forecasts shall be submitted by wire center.
  - Forecasts shall be disaggregated on a monthly level.

• If Pacific Bell misses a mapped sub-measure (see Exhibit 2) for which a CLEC's actual volumes are 20% greater than the forecasted volume, on a monthly basis, a root cause analysis may be triggered.

- If Pacific Bell misses a mapped sub-measure (see Exhibit 2) for which the CLEC has not provided any forecast, a root cause analysis may be triggered.
- Pacific Bell may address the effect on Pacific Bell of an inaccurate forecast in its limited root cause analysis of a missed mapped submeasure. In this review, Pacific must document how, but for the variance in the CLEC's forecast and actual volumes for one of the categories above (<u>i.e.</u>, service requests, interconnection trunks or collocation), Pacific Bell would not have missed the mapped submeasure. For purposes of the limited root cause analysis, the performance measures potentially affected by forecasting are set forth, or mapped, on the attached chart.

# EXHIBIT 2

# FORECAST MAPPING TO PERFORMANCE MEASURES

	TYPE OF FORECAST		
	Service Order	Collocation	Interconnection
Pre-Ordering			
• 1 - Av. Response Time	X		
Ordering			
• 2 - Av. FOC Notice Interval	X		X
• 3 - Av. Reject Notice Interval	X		X
Provisioning			
• 5 - Percent of Orders Jeopardized	X		X
6 - Av. Jeopardy     Notice Interval	Λ		A
• 7 - Av. Completed Interval	X		X
• 9 - Coordinated Customer Conversions	X		
9A - Frame Due     Time Customer     Conversions			
• 10 - PNP Network Provisioning			
• 11 - Percent of Due Dates Missed			
• 14 - Held Order			

<ul> <li>Interval</li> <li>15 - Provisioning Trouble Reports</li> <li>16 - Percent Troubles in 30 Days for New Orders</li> <li>18 - Av. Comp. Notice Interval</li> </ul>	X		X
	TYPE OF FORECAST		
	Service Order	Collocation	Interconnection
Maintenance			
• 19 - Customer Trouble Report Rate			
• 20 - Percent of Customer Trouble not Resolved within Est. Time			
• 21 - Av. Time to Restore			
• 23- Frequency of Repeat Troubles in 30 day period			
Network Performance			
• 24 - Percent Blocking on Common Trunks			

<ul> <li>25 - Percent         Blocking on         Interconnection         Trunks</li> <li>26 - NXX Loaded         by LERG Effective         Date</li> </ul>		X
Billing		
• 28 - Usage Timeliness		
• 29 - Accuracy of Usage Feed		
• 30 - Wholesale Bill Timeliness		
• 31 - Usage Completeness	X	X
• 32 - Recurring Charge Completeness	X	X
• 33 - Non-recurring Charge Completeness	X	X
• 34 - Bill Accuracy		
• 35 - Billing Notice Completion Interval		
• 36 - Accuracy of Mech. Bill Feed		

	TYPE OF FORECAST		
	Service Order	Collocation	Interconnection
Database Updates			
• 37 - Av. Database Update Interval	X		
• 38 - Percent Database Accuracy			
• 39 - E911/911 MS Database Update Interval			
Collocation			
• 40 - Av. Time to Respond to Collocation Requests		X	
• 41 - Av. Time to Provide a Collocation Arrangement		X	
Interfaces			
• 42 - Percent of Time Interface is Available			
• 44 - Center Responsiveness			

### **Appendix K: List of Appearances**

**Respondents:** Ed Kolto-Wininger and James B. Young, Attorneys at Law, for Pacific Bell; Marlin Ard and Elaine M. Duncan, Attorneys at Law, for Verizon California Inc.

**Interested Parties:** Evelyn C. Lee, Attorney at Law, for WorldCom, Inc.; Randolph Deutsch and Joseph Faber, Attorneys at Law, for AT&T Communications of California, Inc.; Richard L. Goldberg, Attorney at Law, for Sprint Communications Company LP; Theresa L. Cabral, Attorney at Law, for Mediaone Telecommunications of California and Karen Potkul, Attorney at Law, for XO, Inc. (formerly, Nextlink, Inc.)

Office of Ratepayer Advocates: Janice Grau, Attorney at Law.